

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 OES-03 /046 W

----- 039918

R 231946Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9410

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2495

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UY

SUBJ: THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES

REF: STATE 172095

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS FROM AMBASSADOR

1. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, URUGUAY'S ATTITUDE ON ISSUES SUCH AS LISTED REFTEL IS STRONGLY CONDITIONED BY PHILOSOPHY OF A RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE, STRONGLY-MILITARY-SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT WHICH SEES ITSELF AS HAVING BARELY MANAGED TO SAVE A GOOD SOCIETY FROM DESTRUCTION BY INTERNAL FORCES SUBVERTED BY A FOREIGN-INSPIRED CONSPIRACY OF MARXIST ORIGIN WHICH DISTORTED THE INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS OF FREEDOM IN ORDER TO DESTROY FREEDOM. THEREFORE, THE GOU IS SUSPICIOUS OF DETENTE WHICH IT BELIEVES DEMONSTRATES THE MARXISTS' ABILITY TO EXPLOIT DEMOCRATIC FEARS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR COMMUNIST ADVANTAGE. OBVIOUSLY, GOU FAVORS WHAT MIGHT REALY RELIEVE THE WORLD FROM THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WARFARE; BUT IT BELIVES THAT THE COMMUNIST WORLD

IS MANIPULATING FEAR OF THIS THREAT TO WHITTLE AWAY AT THE WEST BIT BY BIT. IN REGARD, SPECIFICALLY, TO THIRD CONTRY HEMISPHERIC ISSUES

THIS BASIC ATTITUDE IS REFLECTED IN CONCERN OVER OAS AND US OVER- TURES TOWARD CUBA AS WELL AS TOWARD ATTITUDES WHICH SEEM OVERLY HARSH AND UNREALISTIC TOWARD COUNTRIES SUCH AS BRAZIL AND CHILE WHICH THE GOU IDENTIFIES WITH AS SIMILARLY HAVING BEEN SAVED FROM COMMUNISM. THE GOU IS MUCH MORE PRONE THAT WE ARE TO ACCEPT (EVEN THOUGH IT MAY

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OFEND URUGUAY'S OWN DEEPLY INGRAINED TRADITIONS) A DEGREE OF

AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOME ENCROACHMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS BEING A REGRETTABLE BUT NECESSARY PRICE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF OTHER TRADITIONAL VALUES IN THEIR SOCIETY.

2. THE ISSUES POSED IN REFTEL:

A) THE GOU'S ATTITUDES TOWARD DISMANTLING OF OAS SANCTIONS ARE VERY WELL KNOWN. THE GOU IS OPPOSED SO LONG AS CUBA HAS NOT DEMONSTRABLY EARNED RESPECTABILITY BY ELIMINATING THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED IN THE FIRST PLACE; I.E., THE PROMOTION OF SUBVERSION IN OTHER AMERICAN STATES. THE GOU FEELS THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS (ABSENT SUCH GOOD REASON) GIVES A TOTALLY UNDESERVED MORAL VICTORY TO CASTRO AND BLINDLY ABETS CUBAN SUBVERSION. AT THE SAME TIME THE GOU IS STRONGLY INTERESTED IN PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY, AND RECOGNIZES THE WEAKENING EFFECT OF DIVISIVENESS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION ON THE ISSUE OF CUBA. IT AMPLY DEMONSTRATES THIS INTEREST IN STATESMANLIKE POSITIONS ON OAS STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES AS WELL AS ON RIO TREATY AMENDMENTS. WHILE CONTINUING STRONGLY TO OPPOSE THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, THE GOU RECOGNIZES THAT IN THE CURRENT REALITIES THIS WILL HAPPEN. IT ALSO IS PROBABLY RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING THIS AS NECESSARY TO AVOID A DEVASTATING SPLIT IN THE OAS.

B) THE GOU IS NOT IMPRESSED BY THE KIND OF RECIPROCAL MOVES BY THE US AND CUBA WHICH RE MENTIONED--NOR WOULD IT BE IMPRESSED BY PING PONG OR BASEBALL DIPLOMACY--WHICH IT WOULD VIEW AGAIN LARGELY AS A COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF DEMOCRATIC NAIVETE AND GOOD WILL FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. WHAT WOULD IMPRESS THE GOU IS SOME REAL EVIDENCE THAT CUBA HAS RENOUNCED THE PROMOTION OF SUBVERSION, AND HAS THEREBY EARNED READMISSION TO RESPECTABLE SOCIETY. AS FAR AS THE GOU IS CONCERNED THERE IS NO SUCH EVIDENCE AND IN FACT IT FREQUENTLY CITES EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. THE GOU IS CONCERNED THAT NO SOME SEEMS TO BE LISTENING IN VIEW OF THE MEMENTUM WHICH THE RETREAD CATRO MOVEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE ACHIEVED. IT ALSO TENDS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS RIVE HAS BEEN GENERATED LARGELY BY A LEFTIST PRESS STIMULATED IN PART BY CLEVER COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. WHILE THE GOU MIGHT BE TOLERANT OF A DECISION TO LIFT SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE OAS, AN ACT OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY, IT WOULD VIEW ANY UNDUE HASTE ON THE PART OF THE US TO RENEW RELATIONS CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH CUBA, OR TO ENGAGE IN TRADE, AS GREATLY ILL-ADVISED IN THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE ACTS DEMONSTRATING CUBA'S GOOD FAITH AND INTERST IN SOLVING BASIC PROBLEMS. WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT THE GOU WILL EXPECT THE US TO SHOW DUE CONCERN FOR THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN SUBVERSION AGAINST URUGUAY. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS HERE.

C) THE GOU IS NOT EMOTIONAL ABOUT THE PANAMA ISSUE BUT

IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE REMOVED THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT ARRANGMENT WHICH CAN BE VIEWED AS ANACHRONISTIC AT THIS TIME AND AS AN INDIGNITY TO A SMALL, FELLOW-LATIN COUNTRY WITH WHICH IT RELATES. IT IS ALSO AS A PRACTICAL MATTER INTERESTED IN THE CONTINUED EFFICIENT OPERATION AND SECURITY OF THE CANAL, AND IN SEEING ELIMINATED FACTORS WHICH PROMOTE DISHARMONY IN THE HEMISPHERE, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY INVOLVE THE US. THE GOU HAS NO INTEREST IN EXPLOITING TO ITS OWN ENDS FRICTION OR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE US AND PANAMA. THE GOU, WE BELIEVE, UNDERSTANDS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM FACING THE AMERICAN EXECUTIVE BRANCH. HAVING HAD ITS OWN PROBLEMS WITH WHAT IT VIEWED AS A RECALCITRANT AND UNMANAGEABLE LEGISLATURE (BEFORE IT CLOSED IT UP), IT IS PROBABLY INCLINED PRIVATELY TO BE SYMPATHETIC. THE CANAL AS SUCH IS NOT A VITAL ISSUE FOR URUGUAY SINCE ITS MAJOR TRADE ROUTES DO NOT DEPEND ON IT.

D) SHOULD TREATY NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN WE BELIEVE THE GOU, FOR REASONS SUGGESTED IMMEDIATELY ABOVE, WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC AND UNDERSTANDING AND CERTAINLY FAR LESS PRONE THAN OTHER LA GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE TO CRITICIZE. WE WOULD EXPECT THEIR ATTITUDE HERE TO BE AS STATESMANLIKE AS IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS OPEC/GSP PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE ACT TO WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT NOT URUGUAY, REACTED IN AN OVERLY EMOTIONAL WAY. THE GOU WOULD IN NO WAY SEE THIS BREAKDOWN AS JUSTIFICATION FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTS BY PANAMA AGAINST CANAL INSTALLATIONS AND WOULD PROBABLY TEND TO SEE SOME DEGREE OF MARXIST INSPIRATION IF SUCH ACTS OCCURRED. WHILE THE GOU'S ACTS WILL BE CONDITIONED BY THE FACTORS STATED ABOVE, IT WOULD NONETHELESS FEEL OBLIGED FOR REASONS OF LA SOLIDARITY TO JOIN IN SOME CONDEMNATION OF THE US IF THE US APPEARS RESPONSIBLE FOR A BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

E) AS INDICATED, THE GOU WAS QUITE REALISTIC AT THE TIME OF THE TRADE ACT EXCLUSION OF OPEC COUNTRIES FROM GSP. IT VIEWED THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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AS UNDERSTANDABLE AS A NATURAL HUMAN REACTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND PROBABLY JUSTIFIED, EVEN THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT WORTH THE CANDLE AS SMART POLITICS CONSIDERING THE NEGLIGIBLE AMOUNT OF GSP INVOLVED FOR ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA. AGAIN, ALTHOUGH THE GOU PROBABLY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE BETTER TO REMOVE THE EXCLUSION IT WOULD BE MORE TOLERANT THAN MOST IF THE EXECUTIVE, IN SPITE OF STRONG AND SINCERE EFFORTS, COULD NOT INDUCE NECESSARY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

F) IN THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES GOING BEYOND THE HEMISPHERE SUCH AS THE OPEC PROBLEM IN GENERAL, THE COST OF ENERGY, BASIC ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL, THIRD WORLD MANIPULATION OF THE UN ETC., ETC., URUGUAY WOULD GENERALLY TEND TO FOLLOW A RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE, NON-EMOTIONAL POLICY CONDITIONED BY SUSPICION OF MARXISM, "THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY", AND OF DETENTE ITSELF. THIS EXPLAINS THE RELATIVELY COOL OBSERVATION

HERE OF THE SPECTACULAR APOLLO/SOYUZ MISSION.

3. IN SUMMARY, WHILE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOU IS CERTAIN
AREAS, ESPECIALLY DETENTE, NONE OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED ABOVE WILL
PRODUCE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF OUR GOOD BILATERAL
RELATIONS WITH URUGUAY ALTHOUGH THE MOOD OF OUR RELATIONS COULD
SUFFER.

IF WE APPEAR TO DISREGARD GOU VIEWS ON INTERESTS ON THE CUBA ISSUE
WE CAN EXPECT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CRITICISM. ON THE PANAMA ISSUE
HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY MOTIVES COULD LEAD
TO SOME CRITICISM AS WELL.

4. GDS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MONTEV02495
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750255-0127
From: MONTEVIDEO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750729/aaaabakn.tel
Line Count: 183
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 172095
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 SEP 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 SEP 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <08 OCT 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES
TAGS: PFOR, UY
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006